Introduction
In a series of papers Hall (1986 Hall ( , 1987 Hall ( , 1988a Hall ( , 1988b Hall ( , 1990 has proposed an innovative method to estimate whether firms set prices above or equal to marginal costs, and hence whether or not they exhibit market power. The method consists in comparing movements in output and inputs through the aggregate production function. An extension of this approach also estimates the degree of returns to scale. Although several alternative procedures to Hall's method have been proposed subsequently, and it has been reevaluated, it nevertheless represents the standard departure point for many analyses of market power.
Jesus Felipe, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, GA 30332-0610, USA. E-mail: jesus.felipe@inta.gatech.edu.and International University of Japan, Niigata 949-7277 Japan. E-mail: jfelipe@iuj.ac.jp J.S.L. McCombie, University of Cambridge, U.K. E-mail: jslm2@cam.ac.uk The purpose of this paper is to provide an assessment of the methodological foundations of this approach, and to demonstrate an important limitation. In doing this, we elaborate and extend an important critique of the aggregate production function discussed, in another context, by Phelps Brown (1957), Shaikh (1974 Shaikh ( , 1980 Shaikh ( , 1987 , Simon (1979) and McCombie (1987) . Felipe and McCombie (2001, 2002) discuss the general issues involved. Given the importance of this critique, it is surprising that it has been largely ignored in the literature. The problem with Hall's method is that the parameter that is theoretically derived as the mark-up, and estimated as such, cannot be unambiguously interpreted in this manner.
The difficulty arises from the fact that the method used to derive an expression for the mark-up is based upon a transformation of the aggregate production function. This poses a problem because of the existence of an underlying accounting identity which defines the measure of output (whether value added or gross output) in terms of the total compensation of the factors of production. It is shown that the equation used to estimate the mark-up can be derived simply as an algebraic transformation of the accounting identity, which has no behavioural implications. In other words, all that is being estimated is an approximation to the identity and the estimates do not necessarily reflect either the underlying technology of the economy or the state of competition. The fact that often the supposed mark-up takes a value that is greater than unity, especially when value added data are used, is due merely to omitted variables bias and cannot necessarily be taken to indicate the existence of market power. The same argument also explains why the use of gross output leads to values of this parameter of around unity. Hall's model, it has been argued, also has important implications for understanding the causes of business cycles.
We also question this interpretation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, Hall's approach is outlined and there is a brief summary of the recent literature. 1 In Section 3, we show why this method to estimate the mark-up is subject to an insoluble interpretation problem. As a consequence, we argue that there is no reason for necessarily interpreting the Solow residual as a measure of technical change. Section 4 demonstrates that the reason why the Solow residual varies procyclically is due simply to variations in the rate of profit derived from the identity, most likely as a result of variations in capacity utilization over the cycle.
Section 5 considers why regressions where factor cost, as opposed to revenue, shares are used to weight the growth of inputs cannot provide evidence of the degree of returns to scale. Section 6 considers some possible objections to our critique and also poses the question as to whether or not it is possible to statistically test the aggregate production per se, as opposed to merely assuming it exists and estimating its putative parameters. Finally, Section 7 draws some conclusions.
A Brief Survey of the Recent Literature
This section provides an overview of the methodology introduced by Hall. 2 Discussion here is limited to key features of the model and a summary of the findings is presented in Table 1 . In order to study whether or nor firms equate price to marginal cost, Hall estimated econometrically the degree of market power, namely, the ratio of price to marginal cost, denoted by µ, under the assumption that this mark-up is constant. He compared actual changes in costs to changes in output. Hall's (1988a) estimating equation is essentially derived from an aggregate production function and is:
where (q t -k t ) is the growth of the output-capital ratio, a t n t is the product of the labour share in value added, or the revenue share, a t , multiplied by the growth of the labourcapital ratio, denoted by n t (i.e., n t = t -k t , where t is the growth of employment ). ϕ t is the rate of technical progress and is modelled as a constant, ϕ, plus a random element u t , the latter being the error term of equation (1). Therefore, the relation between price and marginal cost can be found by comparing the actual growth in (q t -k t ) with the growth that would be expected given the rate of technical progress and a t n t .
The relationship between equation (1) and the Solow residual is a fundamental aspect of Hall's methodology. Solow's (1957) method for measuring total factor productivity growth is derived from the production function Q t = A t F(L t , K t ) where Q, L, K, and A are value added, the labour input, the stock of capital, and the level of technology. Solow calculated the rate of technical progress (or the rate of growth of total factor productivity) as ϕ t ≡ (q t -k t ) -(a t n t ). From a comparison with equation (1), it can be seen that Solow implicitly assumed that µ = 1. Hall showed that when firms charge prices above marginal costs, the share of profits in revenue exceeds capital's output elasticity because the former includes monopoly profits. A corollary is that labour's share will be less than labour's output elasticity. It therefore follows that the estimate of µ in equation (1) will exceed unity in the presence of market power. The standard calculations of total factor productivity, following Solow (1957) , assume constant returns to scale and perfect competition and, consequently, that the output elasticities equal the relevant factor shares in total revenue. Thus, in the presence of market power, the value of the Solow residual will be biased. A finding that the mark-up exceeds unity, therefore, is sufficient to reject the joint hypotheses that firms operate under constant returns to scale and are perfectly competitive. Hall (1988a Hall ( , 1990 used US industry data at the one-and two-digit SIC level. He applied instrumental variable (IV) estimation, as in the presence of market power the Solow residual is correlated with a t n t . The instruments used were variables that affect demand but that should be uncorrelated with technical change. They were the growth rate of the oil price, the growth rate of military expenditures, and a dummy variable for whether the President was a Democrat or a Republican.
3 However, for empirical purposes,
Hall did not estimate equation (1). Instead, he provided the inverse estimate of the instrumental variable regression (i.e. (a t n t ) = c + b 1 (q t -k t )). The reciprocal μ = 1/ b 1 maps all mark-ups greater than unity into the interval from zero to one. The rationale for estimating the inverse regression is that when overhead labour and labour hoarding are high, the growth of labour is only likely to be weakly correlated with the instruments, even though the growth of output is highly correlated (Hall, 1988a p.934) . Under these circumstances, the estimated mark-up and its variance are large.
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The regressions yielded, in general, relatively high and statistically significant estimates of µ, suggesting either that firms fail to maximise profits, or that they possess substantial market power. Therefore, the results were taken to refute the oft-made assumptions of constant returns to scale and perfectly competitive markets. Domowitz et al. (1988) rejected the null hypothesis that price equals marginal cost in US manufacturing, their estimates were much lower than Hall's. In the case of Norrbin, his mark-ups were relatively small and insignificantly different from 1.
Both argued that Hall's estimates were subject to a bias from the use of value added rather than gross output, which they argued was a preferable measure of output for estimating the mark-up. Norrbin, following Hall, derived a similar expression to provide an estimate of the mark-up, but obtained from the gross output production function 
where ( Naturally, the econometric estimation of this equation, an identity, cannot provide any independent evidence that the coefficient estimated is the value of the markup parameter. It follows that, under the interpretation presented here, although the use of gross output, instead of value added, leads to different estimates of µ, this is not the central problem. In fact, a consideration of the identity suggests on a priori grounds that the degree of bias is likely to be smaller when gross output, rather than value added, is used and this is confirmed empirically. Likewise, data problems (such as those introduced by the deflation method chosen) may also lead to biases, but these are of secondary importance. Bresnahan (1989) has also argued that Hall's model has problems because average incremental cost will not provide and accurate approximation to marginal cost if the latter is not constant, and intertemporal aspects of firm behaviour and differences between variable and quasi-fixed factors are not considered systematically. These are valid criticisms, but again they are of second-order importance.
The Use of Value-Added Data
The income identity for value added in real terms is defined as:
where Q, w, r, L, and K denote output (value added at constant prices), the average wage rate, the average profit rate, the level of employment, and the stock of capital, respectively. Equation (3) is an accounting identity that holds for every period of time at the level of the firm, sector, and the total economy, and is compatible with any degree of competition and any degree of returns to scale. As it is an identity, there are no behavioural assumptions necessarily underlying it (e.g. that economic profits are zero). It simply expresses how value added is distributed between labour and capital, without any causal implications. As Samuelson (1979, p. 932) put it: "No one can stop us from labeling this last vector [residually computed profit returns to "property" or to the nonlabor factor] as rK as J.B. Clark's model would permit -even though we have no warrant for believing that noncompetitive industries have a common profit rate r and use leets capital K in proportion to the Q -wL elements!" 7, 8 Expressing equation (3) in growth rates, the following is obtained:
where:
The variables ϕ wt and ϕ rt are the growth rates of the wage and profit rates and a t and (1-a t ) represent the labour and capital (revenue) shares in value. These three equations form the basis of our argument. It must be stressed again that all we have done is to transform an accounting identity, and that no assumptions have been made about the structure of the economy or industries to which the identity pertains. Equation (4) can be rewritten as:
If equation (6a) is estimated as:
it is evident that τ and µ * must both equal unity. Because this derivation follows from an identity, the parameters τ and µ * do not have, per se, any necessary interpretation as structural or economic parameters. 9 The question that arises, in the light of these arguments, is why the estimate of µ in the studies surveyed above generally differs from unity. This is because equation (6b), or a variant of it, is estimated, but with ϕ t replaced by a constant. The equation estimated is thus formally equivalent to equation (1) above.
The estimate of µ in equation (1) 
as µ * = τ = 1. Thus, the magnitude of the parameter µ in equation (7) will be determined by the ratio of the covariance of the omitted and included variables to the variance of the latter, i.e., one plus this bias. The latter can of course be negative and larger than one, thus leading to a parameter below 1. But, in terms of our argument, this has no bearing on the issue of market structure and returns to scale. Note that µ will be 1 if, and only if, cov(ϕ t ,,a t n t ) = 0. This condition, in the context of our derivation (from an identity), does not necessarily imply that markets are competitive. And likewise, µ > 1 will be the result of cov(ϕ t , a t n t ) > 0. This, again, cannot be interpreted as evidence of market power. These arguments explain the results obtained by Hall and others in their mark-up regressions. If these regressions had included the correct specification of ϕ t (rather than substituting ϕ t by ϕ + u t ), they would have found µ equals unity. This is also made readily apparent by considering Hall's (1988a, p.926 ) definition of the mark-up. This, when it varies over time and there is no error, is defined by Hall as
But we know from a consideration of the identity that (q t -k t ) -ϕ t ≡ a t n t and, hence, substituting this into Hall's equation, once again we arrive at the result that µ = 1. The only reason why Hall does not find that this is the case econometrically is that, as we have seen above, he assumes that ϕ t is a constant plus a random term, whereas empirically ϕ t derived from the identity varies over time. Moreover, ϕ t could be calculated directly from the data using equation (5) and hence included explicitly in the regression.
Although we find that the estimate of the mark-up is equal to unity plus the bias due to the omission of ϕ t from the identity (or rather due to the proxying of it by a constant), it should be emphasised that the central tenet of our critique does not rest on this empirical finding. (The reasons for the bias are discussed in Section 4 below.) For example, suppose that the wage and the profit rate are constant over time in our data set.
(In practice, this may be true of a number of developing countries.) In these circumstances, the identity becomes simply q t ≡ a t t + (1-a t )k t or (q t -k t ) ≡ a t n t.
Consequently, estimating the equation (q t -k t ) = c + µ(a t n t ) would, because of the identity, give an estimate of µ of unity, as there is no bias. (We would also get the same result if a t ϕ wt + (1-a t )ϕ rt were orthogonal to a t n t ). The orthodox approach would interpret this as implying that markets were competitive. There is, of course, nothing to production theory to suggest that the fact that wages and the profit rate are constant over time will ensure perfect competition.
In practice, the weighted average growth of the wage and profit rates show a procyclical variation around its mean. (This is confirmed econometrically in Section 4.)
This will be the error term in the regression and leads to a bias in the estimates of the putative "output elasticities" (which may consequently sum to greater or less than unity and may differ from the factor shares). But this, likewise, cannot be assumed to be an independent test of the degree of returns to scale and the marginal productivity theory of factor pricing. We can always improve the goodness of fit by including a flexible nonlinear time trend as, after all, there is nothing in neoclassical production theory that requires technical progress to occur at a constant rate. Alternatively, this could be accomplished by including a variable that is closely correlated with the deviations around the mean of ϕ t . We would thus more closely approximate the accounting identity and so the estimates of the output elasticities would tend to the values of the observed factor shares (see Section 6). The problem is that by using constant-price value data, all the regression is doing is in effect tracking the accounting data.
It must also be pointed out that in the context of an identity the use of an "inverse" estimate and instrumental variable (IV) estimation must be seen as irrelevant, since there is no endogeneity problem, and it may even be a source of error. It can be shown that the IV estimator of the direct regression can be written as
and that of the inverse regression as
where z t are the instruments. If the instruments are not highly correlated with (a t n t ), the estimates will diverge substantially from those provided by OLS. Table 2 shows the estimates of equation (1) for the manufacturing sector of the US over the period 1958-91. Using OLS, the estimate of the mark-up is large, statistically significant, and takes a value of 3.573. From the data we also find that cov(ϕ t , a t n t ) = 5.353×10 -5 and var (a t n t ) = 2.077×10
-5
. The ratio of these two expressions is an exact measure of the bias of the OLS regression given by equation (7) and is 2.57. (The estimate reported in Table 2 is 1 plus this bias.) Table 2 also shows the IV estimates of equation (1) as well as the inverse IV results, as specified by Hall. The same argument follows through in these cases. <Table 2 here>
The Use of Gross Output
What is the effect of using gross output instead of value added? Not surprisingly, the argument outlined above still holds. As discussed in Section 2, several authors have argued that the correct specification of the production function to estimate the mark-up requires the use of gross output as the output measure and the inclusion of intermediate inputs as a regressor and that this significantly affects the estimate of the mark-up.
Nevertheless, the relationship between the gross output production function and the underlying income identity in terms of total sales follows equally. The difference is that the identity is now:
where Y t and M t denote gross output and the constant price value of intermediate inputs respectively (using double deflation); v t is the profit rate for gross output; and p Mt is the relative price of materials. In growth rates:
where, it will be recalled, 
It is readily apparent that if equation (11) is estimated econometrically with τ and µ * as the coefficients of ϕ t ′ and (s Lt n t + s Mt (m t -k t ) ), respectively, τ and µ * must be equal to 1. As in the case of value added data, suppose equation (11) is estimated, but with the term ϕ′ t replaced by a constant. This would be equation (2), and the estimate of µ can be once again reinterpreted as a biased estimate of µ * =1 in equation (11). The bias is given now by:
The results will be, in general, different from those obtained using value added, but the argument remains the same. Norrbin's (1993) (12)), namely 0.42.
As noted in Section 2, in general, the use of gross output, as opposed to value added, will produce a lower estimate of µ (compare left and right hand sides of Table 2 ).
This can also be explained in terms of the accounting identity and the biases given by equations (7) and (12). From equation (11), the closer the weighted average of the growth of the wage and profit rates is to a constant, the lower the bias. Generally speaking, the growth of materials shows a much higher procyclical variation than either the growth of labour or capital, and it is highly correlated with the growth of output. Similarly, the revenue shares show little cyclical variation, so they may be treated as a constant. The weighted average of the growth rates of the factor prices when the price of intermediate goods is included shows a procyclical variation around its mean . However, this is smaller than that of the weighted growth of the wage and profit rates. Thus, the inclusion of the weighted growth of materials in the sum of the weighted growth of inputs causes a greater cyclical variation compared with the case when value added data is used (compare Figures   1 and 2 This, combined with the stability of the factor shares, means that the denominator of the bias in equation (12) will be much larger than that of equation (7), i.e., (var(s Lt n t + s Mt (m t -k t )) > var(a t n t ) ). The covariances in the numerators in both expressions for the degree of bias are of a similar order of magnitude. Therefore, the degree of omittedvariable bias will be considerably reduced with the use of gross output, and the goodness of fit will improve simply because we are more closely approximating the accounting identity. 
Profit Rates, Cyclical Fluctuations, and the Mark-up
There has been a long debate as to the causes of cyclical fluctuations in the growth of labour productivity and total factor productivity. The standard argument for a long time was that such procyclicality was the result of labour hoarding (Oi, 1962) . Productivity declines in a temporary slump because under-utilised workers are kept on by firms in anticipation that once the recession is over they will be productive again. It is costly to lay off and then re-hire workers. This view was challenged by the work of the real business cycle school, according to which economic fluctuations are driven by exogenous technological shocks (Prescott, 1986) . More recently, Hall (1988a Hall ( , 1990 has argued that perfect competition rules out procyclicality, and, therefore, the observed procyclicality of the Solow residual is the result of imperfect competition. However, by examining the sources of bias in the accounting identity, we can show that the observed procyclicality of the Solow residual is mostly due to the procyclical fluctuations of the observed rate of profit. It will be recalled that we are skeptical as to the interpretation of the Solow residual as "technical change".
The bias in equation (6a) can be estimated through the auxiliary regression: ϕ t = c + φ (a t n t ), where the estimated parameter φ equals cov(ϕ t , a t n t )/var (a t n t ). As from equation (5) we know the two components that make up ϕ t , we can estimate the two auxiliary equations:
The results are reported in the upper half of Table 3 , where it can be seen that most of the bias is due to equation (13b) [ Table 3 about here]
The growth of the wage rate is mildly procyclical (wages are sticky) whereas that of the rate of profit is markedly so. The most likely explanation of this observation is that, because of excess capacity in the downturn, profits fall in a recession (for a recent assessment of the link between profits and cycles see Zarnowitz, 1999) . Thus, the procyclical movement of the rate of profit is not a surprising result. The shares of labour and capital show a slight secular trend over the period but no noticeable cyclical fluctuations. Consequently, ϕ rt is highly correlated with the growth of output, q, and the growth of labour , and this explains the results of the second auxiliary regression, and the substantial degree of omitted variable bias leading to the implausible results of the markup.
Two further points are worth noting. First, if we were to adjust the capital stock and measure the growth of the capital services by the rate of change of the flow of capital services, this would show a pronounced cyclical fluctuation and the implied rate of profit would exhibit very little variation, as capital's share is roughly constant. This would reduce the degree of bias of the estimate of µ. Secondly, as we noted above, if there were no growth in the wage rate or in the rate of profit, the estimate of µ would by definition be unity, although this would not imply that the economy had suddenly become more competitive.
There is a similar argument concerning the use of gross output. While ϕ′ t shows a procylical fluctuation, the degree is less than in the case of value added. Consequently, the bias in proxying ϕ′ t by a constant is less than in the case of value added. The bias in estimating equation (11) 
The regression results shown in the bottom half of Table 3 confirm the above arguments. In particular, it can be seen that the growth of the relative price of materials shows no significant correlation with the growth of the weighted factor inputs. The important conclusion of the previous analysis is that the procyclicality of the Solow residual, and, therefore, economic fluctuations, is a result of the procyclicality of the profit rate derived from equation (3), acting through the accounting identity. This is not to say, though, that there is an implied direction of causality here. The association is most likely due to the well-established fact of variations of capacity utilisation, together with a constant profit share, and does not necessarily reflect variations in technical change.
Surprisingly, none of the studies that have estimated the mark-up specified the regression in the unconstrained form, viz., for value added:
and for gross output:
The results are reported in Table 4 for value added and gross output. We cannot reject the null hypothesis that µ 1 = µ 2 for value added and µ 1 = µ 2 = µ 3 = µ 4 for gross output. However, for gross output (which as we saw in Section 1 has been argued to be the preferable specification) the coefficient on the weighted growth of capital (-µ 2 ) takes the wrong sign, regardless of whether OLS or IV estimation is used. It is only the large associated standard errors the prevents the null hypotheses from being rejected. This The implied values of the output elasticity for capital from the restricted specification reported in Table 2 are equally implausible and are -0.518 and -0.076. For the inverse regression, the value added output elasticity of labour is not significantly different from zero and hence little credence can be placed on the value of capital's output elasticity calculated from the results of this specification.
In the case of gross output, the output elasticity of labour is given by µ 1 L s and µ 2 L s and the output elasticity of materials is given by µ 3 M s and µ 4 M s . In the unrestricted regression, as we have noted, the coefficient of s L k takes the wrong sign, although it is statistically insignificant, and hence there is little point in calculating capital's output elasticity. In the restricted regression (Table 2) , the estimates of capital's output elasticity are again highly implausible, varying from 0.063 (OLS) to 0.004 (IV).
Hall's (1988a) results also produce implied negative values for capital's output elasticity. If we take labour's share of 0.5 as the value which produces the lower limit for the estimate of capital's output elasticity, only one out of his estimates for the 7 onedigit SIC industries (services) gives a positive value for capital's output elasticity, and even here it is an implausible 0.07. 12 (See Hall, 1988a, Table 4, p.940.) Consequently, even if one accepts all the usual neoclassical assumptions, this alone should raise questions as to whether the correct specification of the production function is being estimated and whether the results are reliable. This problem, as far as we are aware, has been ignored in the literature as all the studies, including Hall's, estimate the constrained form for both value added and gross output, which conceals this implausible result. Hall (1988a, p.922) states that "the test developed in this paper rests on the assumption of constant returns to scale. That is, the hypothesis being tested is the joint hypothesis of competition and constant returns to scale". Ignoring for the moment the implausible estimates obtained for the output elasticity of capital, a significant mark-up is found which rejects the null hypothesis of perfectly competitive markets.
The Solow Residual, Increasing Returns to Scale, and Revenue and Cost Shares
Consequently, it is not clear why Hall estimates the value of the mark-up by a method that assumes constant returns to scale. There seems to be an internal contradiction in this procedure.
It is noticeable that Hall's (1988b Hall's ( , 1990 later work extends his analysis to allow for the possibility of increasing returns to scale. The degree of returns to scale is given
by Hall as γ = (∂F/∂L)(L/Q) + (∂F/∂K)(K/Q).
As µ a is taken to be labour's output elasticity when value added data are used, it follows that β = γ -µ a , where β is the output elasticity of capital. It is a straightforward matter to show that, using revenue shares, the specification allowing for increasing returns to scale becomes:
Equation (16) number of what can be best described as heroic assumptions, but which will not be considered here.
Hall's methodology using cost shares is similar to that using revenue shares, but with some important differences. First, when cost shares are used and there are constant returns to scale, there should be no correlation between the residual and exogenously determined movements in output and input growth. On the other hand, with increasing returns to scale, the Solow residual will be positively correlated when output growth increases, even though there has been no shift in the production function. Hall's estimating equation now becomes:
The focus of interest is on the degree of returns to scale as a direct estimate of the mark-up may be calculated as the ratio of labour's revenue to cost share, a r /a c = µ = p/x. Hall (1988a, Table 1 and 1988b, Table 1 ) reports data for the nondurable goods industry. Using these data, we calculated that the mark-up for this industry is on average 1.10, which is significantly less than the value of 2.06 obtained from the regression analysis using revenue shares as weights. Hall (1988b, p.4) now concludes: "As a practical matter, it makes almost no difference whether cost or revenue shares appear in the productivity measure, because pure profit is sufficiently small that cost and revenue are the same". This is at somewhat at variance with the results of his previous approach, namely the estimates of the mark-up obtained from the regression analysis and discussed above, to the extent that the latter implied substantial market power. However, Hall (1988b , 1990 ) finds significant estimates of increasing returns to scale at both the onedigit and the two-digit SIC level.
We confirmed this for the nondurable goods industries, using Hall's data. When
the inverse IV regression (a ct t + (1-a ct )k t ) = -ϕ/γ + (1/γ)q t is estimated, it is found that
γˆ is 3.731 (with a t-value of 2.10), which is close to Hall's estimate of 3.107.
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Regressing the growth of output directly on the weighted growth of the factor inputs using the IV method gives a smaller, but still substantial, value of increasing returns to scale of 2.658 (t-value: 2.74).
However, the reason for these results is similar to the one we have discussed above, namely that all that is being estimated is a misspecified identity. As the cost and revenue shares are very close in value, the accounting identity is given by approximately:
or, alternatively,
where γ = 1.0. The fact that empirically γ exceeds unity is because once again ϕ t is proxied erroneously by a constant. However, the argument is a little more complex than this. In the neoclassical analysis, even though in the presence of market power the appropriate values of the output elasticities are the cost shares, the measure of the "volume" of output is still constant-price value added. This is measured as VA ≡ wL + r c K + Π, where Π is total monopoly profits. This last term may be written as r m K where r m is the monopoly component of the rate of return derived from the accounting identity, r, i.e., rK = r c K + r m K. Thus, it could be legitimately argued that the monopoly profits should be excluded from the definition of the "volume" of output (i.e. value added should be calculated using marginal costs rather than market prices) so that the residual does not include the rate of change in monopoly profits. The latter, of course, has nothing to do with the rate of technical change. Hence, if this procedure is followed and the adjusted value added is given by VA* ≡ wL + r c K, the arguments above concerning the identity follow through exactly.
Finally, even if we were to assume an underlying aggregate production function together with the standard neoclassical assumptions, Hall's specification of equation (17) conceals the evidence of a serious misspecification error, similar to that found above with the use of revenue shares. When equation (17) Thus, even granted the usual neoclassical assumptions, no reliance can be placed on
Hall's results as correctly measuring the degree of returns to scale or that a correctly specified production function is being estimated.
Testing the Aggregate Production Function
It is useful to deal briefly with possible misinterpretations of our critique and to consider whether one can actually statistically test for the existence of a well-defined aggregate production function. The latter is certainly the view of Solow (1974, p. 121) who considers that: "when someone claims that aggregate production functions work, he means (a) that they give a good fit to input-output data without the intervention of factor shares and (b) that the function so fitted has partial derivatives that closely mimic observed factor shares".
It could be argued that the second part of expression (7), namely the degree to which µ is biased away from unity, has, in effect, an economic interpretation in terms of reflecting the production technology. This is because equation (5),
under the usual neoclassical assumptions can be interpreted as the dual to the Solow residual and equals the rate of technical progress. However, this reasoning overlooks the fact that for what we referred to as the bias in equation (7) to have a technological interpretation requires the existence of an aggregate production function together with the conditions for producer equilibrium (as is implicit in the studies discussed in Section 2 above). Only in this case could one argue that the Solow residual measures technical progress, and that the growth of each factor multiplied by its factor share measures the contribution of the input to overall output growth in a causal sense. (In the case of increasing returns to scale the factor share would be multiplied by γ.) However, there may well not be any well-defined or well-behaved aggregate production function.
The aggregate production function has been subject to a number of serious well known, although widely ignored, criticisms both in terms of aggregation problems (Fisher 1993 ) and the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies (Harcourt 1972) . The standard defence of the aggregate production function has been along instrumentalist lines in that these criticisms are irrelevant since the production function "works", in the sense that it gives good statistical predictions and a close statistical fit to the input-output data. But this raises a further empirical issue. The arguments and results in Sections 3 and 4 have been derived exclusively from an accounting identity, without any reference to the state of competition, the aggregate production function, and optimization conditions. This is not a trivial issue as it makes the production function a non-refutable hypothesis. The better the goodness-of-fit of the putative production function, the closer the estimates of the elasticities will be to the values of the factor shares, without necessarily implying competitive markets or indeed the existence of a well-behaved production function.
Furthermore, our critique does not imply that the neoclassical approach ignores the presence of the accounting identity (see, for example, Jorgenson and Griliches, 1967) . However, it does raise important methodological issues relating to the testing and estimation of production functions. The orthodox approach assumes that there is a technological relationship between Q, K, and L and that one can estimate such technological parameters as the elasticity of substitution, the degree of returns to scale, and the output elasticities. It also shows that if perfect competition and the marginal productivity theory of factor pricing prevail, then factor shares will equal the output elasticities. Thus, from the production function together with the assumptions of profit maximisation and competitive markets, we can derive the expression q t = ϕ t + a t t + (1-a t )k t . But, from the identity, we have seen that q t = a t ϕ wt + (1-a t )ϕ rt + a t t + (1-a t )k t .
The orthodox approach to estimating production functions specifies some particular form of the production function and usually (but not always) specifies a linear time trend to capture technical change. To the extent that the actual specification of the production function tracks over time the changes in factor shares and in the weighted average of the growth rates of the wage and profit rates, then we will find, by virtue of the identity, that the estimated output elasticities do, in fact, equal the factor shares. In practice, the shares are often roughly constant and a Cobb-Douglas gives a good fit, but this is not essential to the argument.
Consequently, if we were to estimate the identity as q t = b 2 (a t ϕ wt ) + b 3 ((1-a t )ϕ rt ) + b 4 (a t t ) + b 5 ((1-a t )k t ) or, equivalently, as q t -k t = b 6 (a t ϕ wt + (1-a t )ϕ rt ) + b 7 (a t ( t -k t ))
all the estimated coefficients would be unity. If in the last equation we replace (a t ϕ wt +
(1-a t )ϕ rt ) by a constant, then the estimate of b 7 will biased to the extent that the weighted growth of wages and the rate of profit are not orthogonal to ( t -k t ). It turns out, as we have seen, that the two variables are positively correlated -both vary procyclically -so that the biased estimate of b 7 exceeds unity. But since we are merely dealing with an identity, this does not imply anything about the structure of production, the mark-up or the degree of returns to scale.
What happens if the supposed aggregate production function is freely estimated econometrically (i.e. without making use of the factor shares)? After all, many studies find that the estimated elasticities do not equal the factor shares. In this case, a particular parameterization of the production function, such as the Cobb-Douglas relationship, would have been estimated. But we can also compare this functional form with the accounting identity and infer a priori the results that would be obtained. If factor shares in this economy are relatively constant (a t ≈ a), and the weighted growth of the wage and the profit rate grow at a constant rate, then the estimated output elasticities of labour and capital (viz. α and β) would be close to the relevant shares in the national income accounts (α = a and β = 1-a). But would that represent a failure to refute the assumption of competitive markets? The answer is that it would not. Factor shares can be constant for a variety of reasons that have nothing to do with a Cobb-Douglas production function (a constant mark-up pricing policy, for example, or the Kaldorian macroeconomic theory of distribution (Kaldor, 1956) ), and thus all that would be estimated is the accounting identity.
However, the estimated parameters of the Cobb-Douglas function are often found to differ greatly from the observed factor shares. In fact, it is not unknown for the estimate of the output elasticity of capital to be negative (see Lucas, 1970 and Tatom, 1980) . Empirically, we saw that this was true of the estimation of Hall's specification, but this also can be shown to occur when the production function is freely estimated.
First, consider the full identity, q t = a t ϕ wt + (1-a t )ϕ rt + a t t + (1-a t )k t . Since the factor shares do not vary greatly, we estimated them statistically as q t = ψ 1 ϕ wt + ψ 2 ϕ rt + ψ 3 t + ψ 4 k t and also in the log-level form. The degree to which these estimates are well determined provides an indication of their constancy. The OLS estimates for the valueadded identity are shown in Table 5 . 14 (The results for gross output are similarly well determined. They are available upon request.) <Table 5 here>
These results indicate that, indeed, the factor shares must be relatively constant
for the values of the estimated parameters to be so close to them. In the light of this result we estimated the Cobb-Douglas "production function" with a linear time trend of
The OLS estimates are reported in Table 6 in logarithmic and exponential growth rate form. <Table 6 here> It can be seen that the "output elasticities" greatly differ from their factor shares and the output elasticity of capital is indeed negative. The question arises as to why the parameters in Table 5 are close to the factor shares, while those in Table 6 are so different. Note that the Cobb-Douglas production function in Table 6 would simply be the income identity if the factor shares and ϕ t were constant. If this were the case, the Cobb-Douglas relationship would have yielded elasticities that were equal to the shares, and an R 2 equal to 1, as it would be merely capturing the identity. We saw that in Table 5 that factor shares are indeed roughly constant. Therefore, the reason for the observed estimates of the coefficients is the result of approximating ϕ t by a constant in the specification of the Cobb-Douglas. The results reported in Table 6 indicate that this is a very poor approximation for the data used.
But this result should not come as any surprise in view of the discussion above concerning the estimate of the mark-up, as the path of ϕ t is already known. As indicated above, given the weak procyclicality of the wage rate, and that factor shares are roughly constant, the fluctuations in ϕ t over time are largely due those of the growth of the profit rate. It is apparent that a constant does not provide a good approximation. 15 We conjecture that we need a rather complex functional form to approximate correctly ϕ t (perhaps a function of sines and cosines). Finding this exact form might not be easy, but it certainly exists, and it is the one that would take us back to the identity. The estimated production function would look like a Cobb-Douglas in L and K (with the elasticities very close to the factor shares), and would have this added complex term.
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The negative elasticity of capital may now be readily explained. As noted above, this is not an unusual result. It is because the rate of return, which varies procyclically, is omitted from, or wrongly approximated in, the regression. 17 The effect of this omission may be readily calculated. The OLS estimator of α in the Cobb-Douglas is (in deviations from the mean) is given by:
To calculate the bias, substitute a t ϕ wt + (1-a t ) ϕ rt + a t t + (1-a t )k t , derived from the identities given by equations (4) and (5), for q t in equation (19) . Taking expectations gives:
The covariances between the stock of capital and the growth rates of the wage and profit rates are negative; while those between the growth rates of employment and the growth rates of the wage rate, profit rate, and stock of capital are positive. This indicates that the second and third terms in (20) will be negative. A similar argument shows why the estimated coefficient of labor in the Cobb-Douglas production function is often well above the value of labour's share.
In many production function studies it has been found that adjusting the growth of capital for changes in capacity utilization improves the goodness of fit, and the coefficient on the growth of capital becomes positive and close to capital's factor share. The reason for this is that the adjusted-for-utilization-capacity stock of capital is procyclical, and given that capital's share is constant, this implies that the derived rate of profit will exhibit less fluctuation. Consequently, the specification of the putative production function more closely approximates the underlying identity (Felipe and Holz, 2001, McCombie, 2001 ).
There is a further issue that needs to be addressed. It could be held that our argument could be applied to any regression analysis, and thus it would be a pointless exercise.
18 For example, suppose the true relationship between two variables, y and x, is However, this argument is qualitatively different from the one with regard to the production function. 19 The best statistical fit of the putative production function is given by the whole identity. There is no way that the estimation of the identity, or of any auxiliary equations, pertaining to the identity can necessarily tell us anything about the technical conditions of production. Moreover, as we have argued above, if the weighted growth of the wage and the profit rate is constant then there is no bias and µ will equal unity, but this cannot be interpreted as implying that perfect competition prevails. The critique of Hall does not depend solely on the existence of a bias. It rests on the fact that the best fit to any production function is merely reflecting an underlying identity and the estimate of µ must equal unity. If this identity is not correctly specified then the estimate of µ will differ from unity.
Of course, one could always start by assuming the existence of an aggregate production function, as does Hall, and interpret the results accordingly. But as Simon (1979) has persuasively argued, the principle of parsimony, or Occam's razor, suggests that all the estimates are picking up are the underlying accounting identity. As we have noted above, there may not even be any well-defined underlying aggregate production function because of the existence of the well-known aggregation problems and/or the problems thrown up by the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies. Nevertheless, we would still get the same statistical results and we would also find that the data give a good statistical fit to a freely estimated aggregate production function (i.e., one that does not make use of the observed factor shares as in Hall's method).
Conclusions
This paper has shown that some recent attempts to estimate econometrically the degree of market power and the degree of returns to scale are problematical. The method pioneered by Hall is based on a comparison of rates of change of output and inputs based on the usual neoclassical assumptions and the existence of a well-behaved production function.
However, there is a problem in that there is also a relationship between the growth of output in value terms and that of inputs (together with factor prices) given by the underlying accounting identity. Because of this, it has been shown that the estimate of the putative mark-up is also the same as unity plus the size of the omitted variable bias inherent in estimating the (misspecified) identity. It turns out that the fact that the estimate of the coefficient of the growth of the labor-capital ratio, weighted by its revenue share, differs from unity is simply due to the fact that the weighted growth of factor prices varies procyclically. This is also the reason why estimates of the supposed degree of returns to scale find such large magnitudes. There are a number of reasons why this procyclical fluctuation may occur (e.g., cyclical variation in capacity utilization rates) that have nothing to do with the degree of competition. There is no way to identify Hall's model (as there are not two behavioural equations) and to show unambiguously that what he (and others) have estimated is the value of the mark-up. Indeed, as has been noted above, Shaikh (1974 Shaikh ( , 1980 and Simon (1979) have pointed out that, for reasons of parsimony or
Occam's razor, the data are more likely to be only reflecting the identity. Whatever view is taken, Hall's procedure must be viewed with a great deal of caution. 
Notes:
The classification of the mark-ups as "large" or "small" refers to how much they depart from µ=1, and is relative to Hall's findings. Hall (1986) used as an instrument the growth rate of real GNP. Hall (1987) used five sets of instruments: (i) oil, oil lagged, and three military variables; (ii) three military variables; (iii) oil, military variables, and political dummy; (iv) military variables and political dummy; (v) rate of growth of real GNP. Hall (1988a Hall ( &b, 1990 ) used military expenditures, oil price (both in growth rates), and a political party dummy. Domowitz et al. (1988) ran the regressions with two sets of instruments: one was output, and the other one were military expenditures and the import price. Norrbin (1993) used the same three instruments as Hall (1988) . Basu (1996) did not directly estimate the mark-up. He inferred this result from the rest of his work. Since he estimated approximately constant returns to scale, and in practice we do not observe large pure profits, it must be the case that mark-ups of price over marginal cost must also be small. He used Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimation. 
Equations (i) and (ii) are the estimates using growth rates and the logarithms of the levels respectively. The constant is not reported for equation (ii) . Equation (i) was estimated using the Exact ML AR(1) method and equation (ii) by the Exact ML AR(2) method. n.a. denotes not applicable. t-statistics are in parentheses.
The average labour and capital share for the period is 0.435 and 0.565. The standard deviation of labour's share is 0.049.
Source: See Table 2 Table 6 The Cobb-Douglas Production Function 
Equations (i) and (ii) are the estimates using growth rates and the logarithms of the levels respectively. The constant is not reported for equation (ii). Equation (i) was estimated using the Exact ML AR(1) method and equation (ii) by the Exact ML AR(2) method. n.a. denotes not applicable. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Source: See Table 2 
